Not Quite a Blog

Link: http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/story/0,10801,94584,00.html?SKC=news94584

(Via Michael Geist's ILN for BNA) The ITAA and their "survey" are both chalk full of shit. The researchers come out on top in this Compuworld piece... I'll include the quotes in the article, not the commentary below and then add my own two cents:

[...]

A recent survey by the Arlington, Va.-based Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) showed that 77% of registered voters aren't concerned about the security of e-voting systems, and ITAA President Harris Miller said critics who claim to be concerned about the issue are really pushing a political agenda on behalf of the open-source software community.

"It's not about voting machines. It's a religious war about open-source software vs. proprietary software," Miller said in an interview with Computerworld. "If you're a computer scientist and you think that open-source software is the solution to everything because you're a computer scientist and you can spot all flaws, then you hate electronic voting machines. But if you're a person who believes that proprietary software and open-source software can both be reliable, then you don't hate electronic voting machines."

[...]

"Every technologist that I have worked with believes that even if we had open-source software, we would still need a paper [audit] trail," said Alexander. "There would be no guarantee that the software that was inspected by the public would be the same software that is running on every machine in every jurisdiction in the country."

Eric Raymond [...] said Miller has the issue wrong. "Most [e-voting] critics, including me, aren't focusing on open-source vs. closed-source at all, but rather on the lack of any decent audit trail of votes -- one that can't be corrupted by software. Open-source would be nice for all the real reasons but is less important than the audit trail."

[...]

"Would they ask questions about the safety of a medical procedure of patients or of doctors?" asked Rubin. "They should ask computer security experts about computer security questions, not end users, who may like the look and feel of the machines but have no way of knowing if they are really secure."

[...]"There's never been a demonstrated case of fraud other than an occasional mechanical problem," said Miller. Asking proponents of open-source software to comment on the security of electronic voting systems "is like asking a bunch of clergymen what they think of premarital sex," he said.

Jim Adler, CEO of VoteHere [... said] "The reality is that 2 million votes were lost in the 2000 election because of machine malfunctions or machine-user interface problems. So the long pole in the tent hasn't been security."

However, Jeff Zaino, vice president of elections at the American Arbitration Association in New York, the largest provider of private election administration services in the country, said paper audit trails for electronic systems are critical -- not only to voter confidence but to preventing an endless number of legal challenges if the election is close.

Only two states, Florida and California, have a manual recount law -- and in Florida, the law doesn't apply to paperless touch-screen systems. "In principle, it's outrageous that we have secret, proprietary voting systems," said Alexander. "We have outsourced our elections to private companies and handed over the keys to the kingdom to a handful of vendors. And all they have said since this debate started is 'Trust us.'"

I agree with most of these quotes... of course, you can't prove or demonstrate fraud without access to records and technology, which is still the subject of ongoing litigation. As well, I think the quote from Alan Dechert of the OVC says a lot in a few words. Many of us in the verified voting camp believe that there is a place for both propreitary and "open" code, but it is becoming clear that completely closed voting technology is a bad thing for everyone involved.