Complications with Sequoia's VVPATs, tapes in CA counties

A recent article from the North County Times here in California reports that at least three counties -- Riverside, Napa and San Bernardino -- do not plan on posting results reports in each polling place, contrary to California law.

Riverside has asked for an exception to the provision in the California Election Code (§19370 and possibly §10260) which mandates the posting of results tapes at each precint (from "County in good (and bad) company"):

Riverside County elections officials say privacy concerns and a range of logistical hurdles prevent them from tallying and posting each precinct's votes at the polling place, but a dozen other counties around the state do so with little problem, according to officials in those counties. [...]

Riverside County Registrar of Voters Barbara Dunmore gave several reasons for deciding not to post the results. For one, she said, there's nothing to keep people from walking off with the tallies. More importantly, observers might be able to deduce how particular people voted at polls where only a handful of voters cast ballots, violating a central principle of American elections, she said.

In addition to arguing above that results posting could implicate voter privacy, Barbara Dunmore, Registrar of Riverside Co., argues that people can "walk off" with these reports, eliminating their usefulness. First, there should definitely be concerns about precincts so small that all ballots cast might be identical. Researchers here at Berkeley, Christopher Crutchfield, David Molnar and David Turner, point this out in a forthcoming paper entitled "Approximate Measurement of Voter Privacy Loss in an Election With Precinct Reports", forthcoming at the NIST/NSF Voting Systems Rating Workshop next week in Washington, D.C. One idea for solving that problem is to consolidate precincts where one of the precincts would have cast uniform ballots otherwise.

Second, people shouldn't be taking the results reports from the precincts. In fact, it is illegal (CA Elec. Code §18570(a)) under California Law to "remove or deface" a results report within 48 hours of the close of polls.

It's clear to me that these counties have chosen to de-emphasize the importance of this provision of California Law, not because of concerns with voter privacy or the utility of posting results records but because the design of their voting machinery. The counties mentioned in this story all use the Sequoia AVC Edge DRE with VeriVote printer (for paper-trail compatibility according to CA law). Instead of designing a printer where poll workers change paper rolls or cartridges, Sequoia has designed the system such that entire printers are meant to be swapped out. These printers are difficult to open. The state's consultant who reviewed the system for the California Secretary of State, Paul Craft, had the following to say in February (from "California Secretary of State Consultant’s Report Sequoia's Voting Systems"):

The poll opening zero tape and the results tape can only be printed on the same paper tape within the VeriVote Printer component. Zero tapes will be at the beginning of the record at the center of the spool. If a jurisdiction wishes to have pollworkers sign the results tape, it must provide a procedure for opening the VeriVote Printer.

I also don't buy the argument floated in the North County Times article that the part of the Election Code (§19370) that requires results to be posted applies only to lever voting machines:

Some elections experts and officials in some counties say the posting requirement, which was written in 1961, can no longer apply: Surrounding parts of the elections code appear to deal with procedures specific to the outdated lever machines, they note. [...]

In the 1960s, when casting a ballot meant pulling a mechanical lever, poll workers at most voting stations tallied and posted their own results before carting the ballots off to a central location. The law that required the procedure then is still on the books, but remains embedded in a part of the elections code that appears to deal specifically with the lever machines, which are obsolete.

The full language of the relevant paragraph of §19370 reads:

If the machine is provided with a recording device, in lieu of opening the counter compartment the precinct board shall proceed to operate the mechanism to produce the statement of return of votes cast record in a minimum of three copies, remove the irregular ballot, if any, record on the statement of return of votes cast record. The irregular ballot shall be attached to the statement of result record of votes cast for the machine and become a part thereof. One copy of the statement of return of votes cast for each machine shall be posted upon the outside wall of the precinct for all to see. The statement of return of votes cast for each machine for the precinct shall constitute the precinct statement of result of votes cast. (emphasis added)

The language is clear to me and it is clearly in contrast to the language of the preceding paragraph which refers to specific features of lever machines such as "counting compartments" and "counter numbers". This paragraph was intended to cover "Elections Using Voting Machines" (the title of that chapter of the code) that are conducted on voting machines other than lever machines or those based on counters.

I have a hard time believing that the Registrars in Riverside, Napa and San Bernardino counties are being as forthcoming as they should be in their moves to waive or disobey this aspect of California election law. I would really like to hear what their real concerns are. Are the procedures for opening the printer too complicated? too complicated for the aging poll worker population? Does opening the printer subsystem at the end of the day unreasonably compromise the chain of custody for the paper trail inside? Basically: On what basis are these decisions really being made?