California ACLU quietly weighs in on e-voting...
The Northern and Southern California chapters of the ACLU recently (and quite quietly) released a set of recommendations entitled, "Joint Report And Recommendations On Electronic Voting".
What's the gist? They recognize that they were a tad premature last year in demanding that all California counties move to electronic voting (their lawsuit survived appeal but tanked with the full 9th Circuit appellate court (ruling)). They seem to place more favor with the benefits that DREs bring to the disenfranchised (illiterate, non-english speaking, disabled) over the grave risks of using them in their current state of disrepair.
I think this is a tad sensational. I hate to sound callus, but are we going to accept a dangerously flawed technology�like the current slate of e-voting with DREs which provide no independent audit or voter-verification�just because a tiny minority of voters may not be able to vote entirely independently? I would rather they not be allowed to vote at all if this would mean the rest of us got the assurance that our vote was counted accurately in an auditable manner.
They do have a few great points to which I should bring your attention. From page 9:
4.6 New DRE architectures may emerge that would render a V-VPAT system unnecessary.
Really? I want to see this. I think the Open Voting Consortium has one solution: using entirely open-source code on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) PCs. Not much you have to trust there.
Next, from page 12:
5.5 Non-Paper Audit/Recount.
While the adoption of a V-VPAT may be necessary as an interim measure, the California Affiliates do not believe that, in the long run, a V-VPAT will necessarily prove to be the best means of providing an independent record of votes cast using DRE voting systems. V-VPAT is at the moment, however, the system which is closest to being developed as a viable means of conducting a recount. That is why the California Affiliates insist, above, that efforts be made to quickly develop a robust and reliable and accessible V-VPAT system. The fundamental problems inherent in relying on a paper record should not be underestimated, however, and cannot likely be eliminated completely. We therefore strongly urge the development of an electronic voting architecture capable of producing an independent record of each electronically-cast vote to be used in performing the audit and recount functions currently envisioned for the V-VPAT. [emphasis added]
What the hell is this if not a paper record? Independent/official records need to be verifiable by the voter before being placed in a ballot box. How are we going to do this without paper and in such a way that a common voter understands what the hell is going on? That is, we can think up as nifty of a security scheme as we want, but if the average/median voter can't easily understand it, it will be just as mysterious as the current DREs with proprietary code and no verifiability. Simplicity and transparency are close cousins... in that vein, from page 13:
5.6.4 Because open source code provides greater security and transparency, it increases voter confidence. Therefore, the Secretary of State should encourage the development of a non-proprietary, open source DRE voting system, such as the Australian model.
Ah, the Australian model... good stuff. Don't forget the OVC!
Finally, the recommendations they list in the Appendix are really good... even if just this part of their document were implemented, I'd rest easier at night. Here are the recommendations (I'll embolden things I think are especially important):
ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED BEFORE ANY DRE VOTING SYSTEMS ARE USED
Separate the voter-casting function from the vote-tabulating function so that these two functions occur on separate and independent systems.
Base official election results only on tabulations from the memory cards from each voting machine, which shall be hand-delivered by two persons from the polling place to the central vote tabulation facility. While counts should also be transmitted via modem, those counts may be used only in the event that it is shown that memory cards from a particular polling place have been lost or corrupted.
Require all vendors to escrow with the Secretary of State the source code for all vote-casting and vote-tabulation software to be subjected to a security assessment by an independent testing body.
Require that all pre-election Logic and Accuracy testing be conducted only by election officials or by an independent testing agency and not by any person who has any affiliation with the vendor of the voting system.
Load all machines with identical, digitally signed software that is checked both before and after the election to ensure that the software used is the software that has been escrowed with the Secretary of State.
Submit a statement under penalty of perjury both from the county Registrar of Voters and from a responsible official from the vendor of the voting system that he or she has made diligent inquiries and has ascertained that no untested or uncertified software has been installed on any voting machine or on any computer equipment used to tabulate voting results.
Adopt detailed protocols, subject to public review and comment, that will ensure the physical integrity of the voting machine from the moment the software is loaded through the vote-counting and vote certification process.
Adopt detailed protocols, subject to public review and comment, that will ensure that each polling place has all of the necessary equipment, infrastructure, and supplies to ensure the voting process will not be delayed, including provision to enable voting to continue in the event machines break down.
Upgrade the number and training of poll workers to ensure that at every polling place poll workers are competent to deal with any anticipated technical or mechanical problems arising from the use of DRE voting machines.
Word to your mother. That last bit is good stuff... we don't want Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia or Intercivic employees touching the machines on election day unless it's to get a refund on a hopeless system. Way to go ACLU-NC and ACLU-SC... you do seem a tad schizophrenic in all of this, but you're standing up for the little guys, as always. I wouldn't want it any other way.
Posted by joebeone at Marzo 25, 2004 09:03 PM | TrackBack